The University of Southern Mississippi

The Aquila Digital Community
Dissertations

Fall 12-1-2010

The Relation Between Anger Rumination,
Provocation, and Aggressive Behavior
Joshua Stephen Bullock
University of Southern Mississippi

Follow this and additional works at: https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations
Recommended Citation
Bullock, Joshua Stephen, "The Relation Between Anger Rumination, Provocation, and Aggressive Behavior" (2010). Dissertations. 565.
https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations/565

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact Joshua.Cromwell@usm.edu.

The University of Southern Mississippi

THE RELATION BETWEEN ANGER RUMINATION, PROVOCATION,
AND AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR

by
Joshua Stephen Bullock

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School
of The University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 2010

ABSTRACT
THE RELATION BETWEEN ANGER RUMINATION, PROVOCATION,
AND AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR
by Joshua Stephen Bullock
December 2010
Maladaptive, excessive anger rumination, conceptualized as self-focused attention
towards thoughts and feelings associated with the emotion of anger, has been linked to
actual aggressive behaviors. In general, the emotional experience of anger in response to
provocation is a well-known antecedent of aggression. Anger rumination may be
associated with increased risk for aggressive behavior by maintaining and lengthening the
experience of anger. It is therefore reasonable to posit that individuals high in anger
rumination may be more inclined to expend greater effort to aggress in response to
provocation compared to low ruminators. That is, high ruminators when angered may be
more likely to perseverate at an effortful task required to gain access to an aggressive
response compared to low-ruminators. Accordingly, the aim of this study was to test the
notion that anger rumination is positively associated with a propensity to expend greater
effort to aggress in response to provocation. Men and women (N = 123) participants
interacted with an increasingly provocative fictitious opponent during a competitive
reaction time game during which electric shock was administered and received.
Aggressive behavior was defined in two ways: The mean level of shock selected and the
total number of supposedly harmful shocks selected. Participants were assigned to one of
two effort conditions. Specifically, half were be assigned to a low-effort condition in
which all shock levels required minimal and equal effort to access. The other half were
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assigned to a high-effort condition in which access to relatively greater levels of
aggressive responding required engaging in an increasingly effortful task (i.e., a series of
greater and greater button-presses to access respectively more intense shock levels).
Before the task, anger rumination was elicited by having the “opponent” denigrate the
participant through the use of false feedback on an ostensible measure of intelligence.
After the task, dispositional anger rumination and trait anger were assessed using selfreport measures. It was hypothesized that: requiring effortful responding would decrease
aggressive behavior overall; anger rumination (controlling for trait anger) would be
uniquely associated with aggressive behavior following provocation in the high-effort
condition due to the continued activation of aggression-maintaining affect and cognitions
(that is, participants high in trait rumination would be more motivated to respond
aggressively when provoked and expend greater effort to aggress); and trait anger would
be associated with aggression primarily in the low-effort condition controlling for anger
rumination. Only hypothesis 1 was fully supported: requiring significant effort in order to
aggress decreased the mean shock selected even at high levels of provocation, trait anger,
and anger rumination. Anger rumination was found to be predictive of aggression;
however no relationship emerged with effort condition. Trait anger was not significantly
predictive of aggressive behavior. The lack of support for hypotheses 2 and 3 suggests
that the aggression-dampening effects of the high-effort condition may override the
aggression-promoting qualities of anger rumination. Future research could apply this
finding to other moderating variables (such as impulsive aggression vs. instrumental
aggression) to determine if the effects generalize to those groups. A future study could
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also explore what aspects of the effort manipulation are responsible for the decreases in
aggression noted in this study.

iv

COPYRIGHT BY
JOSHUA STEPHEN BULLOCK
2010

The University of Southern Mississippi

THE RELATION BETWEEN ANGER RUMINATION, PROVOCATION,
AND AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR
by
Joshua Stephen Bullock

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School
of The University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Approved:

Mitchell E Berman, Ph.D. ______________
Director

Bradley Green, Ph.D. __________________

Randolph Arnau, Ph.D. ________________

Michael Madson, Ph.D. ________________

Susan A. Siltanen_____________________
Dean of the Graduate School

December 2010

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank, first and foremost, my major professor, committee chair and
all-around professional role-model, Dr. Mitch Berman. Without Dr. Berman’s input,
statistical advice, and extensive comments, the completion of this document would have
been impossible. I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation
committee: Drs. Randy Arnau, Brad Green, and Mike Madson, all of whom provided a
great deal of support and feedback throughout this process. Thanks as well to Dr. Eric
Dahlen for making me aware of the Differential Emotions Scale.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................... v
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................vii
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1
Background
The Current Study
Hypotheses

II.

METHOD ............................................................................................... 21
Participants
Measures
Procedure

III.

RESULTS .............................................................................................. 30
Descriptive Statistics
Bivariate Correlations
DES Anger Pre/Post
DRS Validation
Multiple Regressions

IV.

DISCUSSION ......................................................................................... 49
Interpretation of Findings
Potential Contributions of the Current Study
Limitation of the Current Study
Future Research and Possible Variations
Conclusion

APPENDIXES .............................................................................................................. 59
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 71

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table
1.

Descriptive Statistics .......................................................................................... 31

2.

Intercorrelations between Rumination Measures and Subscales,
Anger Measures, and Aggression Measures ....................................................... 33

3.

Significance of ARS Regression Model.............................................................. 34

4.

B Weights and Associated Statistics for DRS Validation Regression Model ....... 34

5.

Step 1 Excluded Variables DRS Validation Regression Model ........................... 35

6.

Significance of DV1/DV2 Regression Model – Mean Shock .............................. 39

7.

B Weights and Associated Statistics for DV1/DV2 Multiple Regression
Model – Mean Shock ......................................................................................... 40

8.

Significance of Low/High Multiple Regression Model – Mean Shock ................ 42

9.

B Weights and Associated Statistics for Low/High Multiple Regression
Model – Mean Shock ......................................................................................... 43

10.

Significance of DV1/DV2 Regression Model – Total 20 Shocks ........................ 44

11.

B Weights and Associated Statistics for DV1/DV2 Multiple Regression
Model – Total 20 Shocks.................................................................................... 45

12.

Significance of Low/High Multiple Regression Model – Total 20 Shocks .......... 47

13.

B Weights and Associated Statistics for Low/High Multiple Regression
Model – Total 20 Shocks.................................................................................... 48

vii

1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Rumination is a complex behavior that has been shown to influence numerous
psychological phenomena (e.g., executive functioning, depression, aggression, and social
anxiety). Although aggression has been experimentally linked to anger rumination (e.g.,
Borders, Barnwell & Earleywine, 2007; Vasquez, Bartsch, Pedersen, & Miller, 2007) the
processes responsible are not known. One possible explanation for this relationship is the
perseverative, anger-maintaining nature of ruminative thought. The goal of this study is
to examine the relationship between anger rumination, provocation, and the motivation to
engage in aggressive behavior using a modified version of a well-validated laboratory
measure of aggression: the Taylor Aggression Paradigm (Taylor, 1967). In this paper, a
brief review of emotions and anger will be discussed. Next, rumination and its correlates,
as well as aggression and provocation, will be described. This will lead to an examination
of the impact of rumination on aggression followed by the rationale for this study.
Background
Angry Emotions
A number of different definitions for emotion as well as theoretical models for the
genesis of specific emotions have been proposed. The Cognitive-Motivational-Relational
theory (Lazarus, 1991), for example, holds that emotions have “a clear, personally
significant, relational content, an appraisal of personal harm, threat, challenge, or benefit,
the potential for action readiness, and physiological changes” (Lazarus, 1991 p. 820).
Thus, if an individual perceives a situation as harmful or threatening, and also
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experiences a sense of physiological arousal, the resulting emotional response will be
expressed as anger.
In his neo-associationist model of anger, Berkowitz (1990) also identifies the
importance of cognition in the activation of anger; however, this theory puts greater
emphasis on the importance of negative affect. In Berkowitz’s model, negative affect
primes anger or aggression related memories and ideas, leading to angry or aggressive
responding. This contrasts with Lazarus’ theory of emotion, in that the complex thoughts
and attributions thought to lead to anger are not initially present in anger-provoking
situations. Instead, a more automatic associative process between a network of thoughts
and feelings related to anger, aggression, and negative affect leads to an angry reaction.
Only after this initial response do higher cognitive processes become influential.
In order to support his theory, Berkowitz reviews research in which women were
put into physically uncomfortable positions and asked to rate attitudes toward their
mothers, significant others, and acquaintances (Monteith, Berkowitz, Kruglanski, &
Blair, 1990). There was a significant effect of the discomfort manipulation, which
resulted in increased negative affect, on participants’ self-reported anger and irritation.
Effects on the attitudes they espoused about their significant others and acquaintances
were also noted. Participants who experienced greater discomfort reported more anger
and irritation in general and reported more specific anger toward significant others and
acquaintances, although not toward their mothers. This finding lends credence to the idea
that negative affect alone is capable of priming anger. This idea is important in
understanding the role ruminative thought plays in maintaining anger and aggression.
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Rumination
There is a body of research suggesting that persistent negative affect can
ultimately promote negative outcomes such as aggression or depression (Bushman,
Bonachi, Pedersen, Vasquez, & Miller, 2005; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). Rumination is
thought to play a central role in the relationship between emotions and behaviors by
maintaining the activation of negative emotions after they typically would have
dissipated. Rumination has been defined as “…self-focused attention towards one’s own
thoughts and feelings” (Bushman et al., 2005 p. 970). Rumination has been hypothesized
to function as a coping or problem-solving mechanism, although not an effective one
(Watkins & Moulds, 2005). This is because rumination tends to be more abstract than
concrete. This means that the content of ruminative thought deals more with nonspecific,
global themes and ideas. In contrast, non-ruminative problem solving is geared to specific
problems and situations. For example, after receiving a poor grade, a ruminator might
think, “I’m a failure academically;” whereas a non-ruminator might think, “I’ve done
poorly on this one test.” Thus, because of its failure to concretely address specific
problems, ruminative thought is not an effective means of problem solving.
Some individuals are more likely than others to engage in rumination instead of
more effective coping behaviors (Collins & Bell, 1997). Thus the tendency to ruminate
has been conceptualized as trait-like in nature and existing along a continuum. Highrumination individuals are more apt to introspect on thoughts and feelings associated with
anger or sadness and low-rumination individuals are more apt to allow these emotions to
dissipate (Collins & Bell, 1997).
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Research has implicated rumination as playing a role in such diverse phenomena
as maladaptive romantic jealousy (Carson & Cupach, 2000), depression (Crane,
Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson, 1997; NolenHoeksema, & Morrow, 1991; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), displaced aggression
(Bushman et al., 2005), and athlete aggression (Maxwell, 2004). The largest body of
research has focused on rumination on depressive thoughts and rumination on anger.
Although these two types of rumination both involve self-focused, repetitive thought,
there are indications that anger rumination and depressive rumination exist as separate
constructs with distinct negative consequences (Peled & Moretti, 2007). In both cases,
however, ruminative thought can lead to the deepening of either anger or depression
largely because of its circular nature. In anger rumination, for example, the original
trigger of the angry mood is rehearsed repeatedly, fueling the angry mood leading to
further rumination (Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). That is, because negative affect
provokes rumination and rumination maintains negative affect, ruminative thought has a
tendency to perpetuate itself.
Factors Affecting Rumination
Many circumstantial and demographic factors can provoke or inhibit ruminative
thought. In high-rumination individuals, rumination typically occurs in response to an
event or situation that promotes negative affect, especially those situations that involve
important, blocked goals (Borders, Barnwell, & Earleywine, 2007). Blocked goals can be
related to both external events (e.g., ruminating on specific blocked goals or problems)
and internal events (e.g., self-criticism or feelings of worthlessness; Watkins & Moulds,
2005).
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Some gender differences have been observed in rumination. In the case of anger
rumination, men have been shown to ruminate more about an anger provoking stimulus if
they are told they will be able to retaliate against the source of that provocation
(Knoblock-Westerwick & Alter, 2006). Women, conversely, may engage in activities to
dissipate their anger when told that they would be able to retaliate in the future
(Knoblock-Westerwick & Alter, 2006). It has been theorized that, because men are
culturally expected to aggress against their provokers, they ruminate to maintain angry
feelings until the opportunity to aggress arises. Women, in contrast, are expected not to
aggress in response to provocation, and thus dissipate to avoid having to do so. In
contrast, rumination on depressive thoughts and triggers appears to be more common and
intense in women than it is in men (Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998).
Factors that decrease, dissipate, or resolve ruminative thought include distraction
(Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), and reframing (i.e., viewing the ruminationpromoting situation from a different perspective; Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross 2008). In
support of the notion that distraction and reframing dissipate rumination, laboratory
research has suggested that an expressive writing paradigm is effective at dissipating the
negative effects of rumination (Sloan, Marx, Epstein, & Dobbs, 2008). Ironically,
attempting to actively suppress thoughts of anger or sadness actually increases
rumination on these thoughts (Miller, Pederson, Earleywine, & Pollock, 2003).
Why Ruminate?
Some research has been conducted on the reasons individuals ruminate. Watkins
and Baracaia (2001) explored the reasons for rumination in dysphoric ruminators using
both qualitative and quantitative methods. Tendency to ruminate was positively
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correlated with tendency to identify positive benefits to ruminative thought. The most
commonly cited perceived positive benefits involved using ruminative thoughts to better
understand one’s problems or situation. In open-ended interviews and measures, even
high ruminators identified negative aspects of rumination as well as positive, indicating
some ambivalence toward ruminative thoughts.
A similar study of metacognition related to ruminative thought found that angry
ruminators often held a combination of both positive and negative beliefs about their own
rumination (Simpson & Papageorgiou, 2003). Common negative beliefs among trait
ruminators about anger rumination focus on concerns that ruminative thoughts prolonged
anger, whereas positive beliefs included hopes that their ruminative thoughts would
prepare them for future conflict or provide some form of emotional release (Simpson &
Papageorgiou, 2003).
Eliciting and Measuring Rumination
In non-ruminators, angry feelings have been shown to typically dissipate
approximately 10 minutes after the occurrence of an anger-provoking event in the
laboratory (Denson, Miller, & Pederson, 2006). However, these feelings can be
prolonged even in non-ruminators. A number of procedures have been designed to elicit
rumination in laboratory studies. One common method of inducing rumination in
research participants is to ask them to write about or think about specific anger or sadness
eliciting situations (Bushman et al., 2005; Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2008).
Several different scales have been developed to measure rumination. These scales
are typically self-report measures of ruminative cognition. The Ruminative Response
Scale (RRS) and the Rumination on Sadness Scale (RSS) are commonly used measures
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of depressive rumination (Roelofs, Muris, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2006). Both scales
were shown to have very good internal consistency and moderate test-retest stability.
Evidence of construct validity was established for both scales through modest significant
correlations between rumination scores and scores on measures of negative affect.
Anger rumination can be measured using the rumination subscale of the
Displaced Aggression Questionnaire (DAQ; Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006). This
questionnaire has been shown to distinguish between rumination in general and angerspecific rumination (Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006). The DAQ has also been shown
to have high levels of internal consistency (α = .95) and test-retest stability. The DAQ
was validated by correlating it with other measures aggression and rumination as well as
through experimental studies in displaced aggression (Denson, Miller, & Pederson,
2006).
The Dissipation-Rumination scale (Caprara, 1986) is a 20-item measure of anger
rumination. It is an adequately reliable measure of rumination, and has been shown to
predict aggressive behavior in a laboratory setting. A similar measure is the Anger
Rumination Scale (ARS; Sukhodolsky, Golub & Cromwell, 2001), which is a 19-item
measure of rumination on anger. The scale focuses on a general pattern of ruminative
cognition rather than rumination on a specific anger-provoking event. The ARS has
adequate internal consistency and test-retest consistency (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). Its
validity was demonstrated through correlations with measures of related characteristics
(e.g., trait anger, negative affectivity). In sum, a variety of well-validated measures exist
to examine both dysphoric and anger rumination.
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The Relationship of Rumination to Anxiety and Depression
Depressive rumination has been found to lead to longer-lasting and more serious
depressive symptoms (Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007). In a study examining the
emotional effects of a natural disaster, individuals who ruminated to cope with depressive
symptoms were more likely to remain depressed both several days and several weeks
after the earthquake (Nolen-Hoeksema, & Morrow, 1991). In another study, rumination
directly preceding and during the death of a loved one was associated with poorer
adjustment and longer lasting bereavement (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson
(1997).
Rumination and worry are “closely allied cognitive processes” (Hong, 2007, p.
286), but appear to differ in specific and important ways. A common conceptualization of
the difference between the two constructs depicts rumination as a persistent focus on past
events whereas worry is viewed as a persistent focus on future events (Hong, 2007).
Hong also identifies a number of other similarities and distinguishing factors. Worry is
correlated with both depressive and anxious symptoms, whereas rumination correlates
exclusively with depressive symptoms (Hong 2007).
Although distinct from the worry associated with most anxiety disorders,
rumination does appear to play a specific role in social anxiety, wherein it is viewed as a
component of “post-event processing” (PEP; Kocovski & Rector, 2007, p. 112). In PEP,
rumination about a recent social interaction occurs in socially anxious individuals
following the event. This rumination is theorized to help maintain the fear of social
interactions in social phobia by affecting the formation of memories of prior social
events. Residual negative affect from the social situation becomes associated with
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memories of the event formed during PEP. The resulting memories are “dominated by
negative self-perception” (Clark & Wells, 1995, p. 75). An experimental study examining
the relationship between ruminative self-focus and social anxiety suggests that
rumination does indeed exacerbate social anxiety symptoms (Vassilopoulos, 2008). In
this study, participants who reported both low and high social anxiety were assigned to
complete a task that either required them to ruminate analytically (i.e., thinking about
specific symptoms or events) or experientially (i.e., thinking about more general bodily
sensations). Self-report ratings of social anxiety symptoms were obtained following task
completion. Ruminative thought on social anxiety worsened symptoms only in the
evaluative, analytic thought condition. In contrast, non-analytical, experiential thinking
about symptoms actually led to a reduction in social anxiety symptoms. This finding
suggests that the analytical and self-evaluative components of ruminative thought may be
particularly responsible for its deleterious effects in social anxiety.
The Relationship of Rumination to Cognitive Functioning
Rumination has also been associated with cognitive inflexibility. In one research
study, trait-ruminators were found to make significantly more perseverative errors on the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task than did non-ruminators. Moreover, ruminators appeared to
have difficulty adjusting to changes in the environment compared to non-ruminators
(Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). A recent study explored the relationship between
rumination and executive functioning using a Stroop Task. The Stroop Task is an
interference task in which participants must “inhibit or override the tendency to produce a
more dominant or automatic response” (Philippot & Brutoux, 2008, p. 222). Results
indicated that rumination did inhibit executive functioning, but only in dysphoric
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individuals. Specifically, induced rumination was found to impair inhibition, but, in
contrast with Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema, (2000) induced ruminative thought alone did
not have a significant effect on flexibility as measured by the Stroop task. It was found
that the presence of dysphoria in general did have an impairing effect on cognitive
flexibility.
In another study examining depressive rumination and executive functioning,
depressed participants underwent either a rumination induction manipulation or a
distraction manipulation and were then required to perform a random number generation
task that involved executive functioning. Depressed participants had trouble with the
random number generation task while ruminating, whereas non-depressed ruminators did
not. Both depressed and non-depressed participants in the distraction groups did not
display executive functioning problems. This finding suggested that, in depressed
individuals, rumination appears to dampen executive functioning (Watkins & Brown,
2002).
Ruminative self-focus has also been associated with difficulties in solving social
problems (Watkins & Moulds, 2005), but only when the rumination was abstract in
nature (i.e., more conceptual or generalized). Conversely, self-focused rumination on
concrete scenarios or situations appeared to improve, rather than inhibit problem solving.
This finding implicates the abstract nature of ruminative self-focus as being responsible
for the problem solving deficits noted in some ruminators. While there is considerable
evidence that rumination adversely affects executive functioning and problem solving,
much of the research in this area has focused on rumination on depressive symptoms. It
remains unclear as to whether angry ruminators display the same deficiencies.
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Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has been used to examine the
neurobiology of emotional processing in depressed individuals. In one such study,
depressed and euthymic individuals were exposed to personally relevant negative
emotional prompts while their brain function was observed via fMRI (Siegle, Steinhaur,
Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002). Depressed participants displayed longer-lasting
activation of the amygdala than did control participants. This long lasting activation
coincided with self-reported rumination (Siegle et al., 2002), suggesting that problems
with amygdalar inhibition may play a role in depressive rumination.
The Relationship of Rumination to Physiology
Ruminative thought has been experimentally associated with cardiovascular
symptoms. Blood pressure and pulse rate have been observed to increase following
emotional provocations (Glynn, Christenfeld, & Gerin, 2002). Typically these
physiological symptoms return to baseline following the removal of the emotional
stressor. However, in individuals induced to ruminate on the stressor, the return to
baseline was slower and both systolic and diastolic blood pressure remained higher than
in individuals who did not ruminate. This delayed return to baseline blood pressure may
increase the risk for future cardiovascular disease (Glynn et al., 2002).
These effects have also been observed with rumination on events that occurred
weeks or months prior. In another study exploring rumination and cardiovascular
symptoms, women were asked to recall an unresolved anger-provoking event and then
either engage in a distracting task or sit quietly for a period of time. Participants in the
distraction condition ruminated less than those in the quiet-sitting group. Participants who
self-distracted displayed a quicker return to baseline than did participants who ruminated,
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further supporting the connection between rumination and cardiovascular symptoms
(Neumann, Waldstein, Sollers, Thayer, & Sorkin, 2004). Finally, research has indicated
that rumination acts as a moderator between blood pressure and personality variables
such as avoidance and assertion (Hogan & Linden, 2004).
Aggression and Its Antecedents
Rumination has been associated with aggression in several research studies, and
this relationship is central to the current study. Before discussing this relationship,
aggression in general must be discussed. Aggression has been defined as “any behavior
directed toward another individual that is carried out with the immediate intent to cause
harm” (Anderson & Bushman, 2002, p. 28). Aggressive behavior ranges in severity from
milder examples such as verbal insults or hurtful gossip to lethal physical violence.
Aggression can further be subdivided into proactive and reactive types. Proactive or
“cold blooded” aggression refers to using aggressive behavior in order to achieve goals,
such as using physical violence to intimidate a rival. Conversely, reactive aggression is
more impulsive and emotional in nature, and occurs in response to threats or provocations
(Brendgen, Vitaro, Boivin, Dionne, & Perusse, 2006).
Numerous factors contribute to the likelihood that a given individual will engage
in aggressive behavior. These include social learning variables, cognitive variables,
personality variables, and provocation (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Situational factors
that can provoke aggressive behavior include frustration (Anderson & Bushman, 2002),
and unpleasant environmental factors such as physical pain or discomfort, high
temperatures, or sensory factors such as loud noise (Berkowitz, 1993). Social learning
through the modeling of aggressive behavior can also contribute to engagement in future

13
aggressive behavior (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Alcohol consumption has also been
associated with aggressive behavior and, although the mechanism is not fully understood,
it likely involves the disinhibiting effect of alcohol intoxication (McCloskey & Berman,
2003). A number of personality factors besides trait rumination have been implicated in
aggressive behavior. These factors include trait anger, narcissism, neuroticism, and low
self-esteem (Bettencourt, Talley, Valentine, & Benjamin, 2006; Kingsbury, 1978).
Deficits in executive functioning have also been associated with aggressive behavior, by
mediating the relationship between temperament and physical aggression (Giancola,
Roth, & Parrot, 2006).
Aggression and Provocation
Provocations are another important contributing factor to aggressive behavior,
particularly reactive aggressive behavior (Bettencourt et al., 2006). In experimental
research on provocations and aggression, adults and children competing against a
fictitious opponent received increasingly high levels of electric shock and retaliated in
kind (Chermack, Berman, & Taylor, 1997). This method of provocation has been
effective in a number of other studies using the same paradigm (McCloskey & Berman,
2003; Giancola, 2004). A similar relationship between provocation and aggression was
confirmed in children using a laboratory paradigm for measuring aggression (Stadler,
Rohrmann, Steuber, & Poustka, 2006). Provocation was also found to increase anger in
the children examined in this study.
Aggression following provocation has been found to be different than aggression
under neutral conditions. The presence of provocation appears to alter the relationship
between personality variables and aggressive behavior. Neuroticism, a personality
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variable that has been linked to aggressive behavior, appears to increase aggressive
responding only under provocative conditions. In a condition without provocation,
neuroticism appears to have little effect on aggression (Bettencourt et al, 2006).
Provocation has also been illustrated to moderate the effects of gender on aggression.
Bettencourt and Miller’s meta-analysis on gender differences in aggression (1996) cites
the finding that men are generally found to be more aggressive than women according to
the available paradigms measuring aggression. However, this difference almost
disappears in conditions wherein participants are provoked before aggressing.
The Relation of Rumination to Anger and Aggression
A number of studies have implicated anger rumination as playing a significant
role in aggression, particularly in the phenomenon of displaced aggression. For example,
research participants induced to ruminate on a major insult were found to respond with
greater aggression to a later, more minor provocation (Bushman et al., 2005). This effect
persisted even 8 hours later. In another study, a writing paradigm was used to induce
ruminative thought following a major insult. Following rumination, the level of displaced
aggression displayed by participants was then measured. This study further confirmed the
relationship between rumination and aggression, indicating that anger rumination
contributed significantly to displaced aggression (Denson, Pedersen, & Miller 2006).
In a recent exploration of rumination and displaced aggression, Vasquez and
colleagues (2007) applied the displaced aggression model to a prison-sentencing task.
Participants watched a 60-second clip of a violent bank robbery and were asked to either
ruminate by writing an essay about the specifics of the video, or to self-distract by
completing unrelated questionnaires. Participants were then either frustrated through
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exposure to an unrelated frustrating stimulus (having to wait for the researcher to repair a
malfunctioning VCR) or not frustrated. Following this manipulation, participants were
asked to determine the length of a prison sentence for the bank robbers in the video.
Results indicated that, consistent with previous displaced aggression findings,
participants who had ruminated about the priming violent video and then encountered the
frustrating stimulus selected a more severe prison sentence than those who had not
ruminated or had not been frustrated. This finding also supports the existence of a
relationship between rumination and displaced aggression.
In further examination of rumination and aggression, a series of laboratory
studies were conducted to examine the influence of personality variables (i.e., irritability,
emotional vulnerability, and rumination) and self-esteem threat on aggression (Caprara,
Barbaranelli, Colombo, Politi, & Valerio, 1987). In these studies, participants completed
questionnaires measuring their emotional vulnerability, irritability, and rumination, and
then received a self-esteem threat manipulation in the form of negative feedback from a
confederate. Participants were then given an option to punish the confederate via electric
shock during a cover task. Results suggested that trait rumination is a major contributing
factor in retaliatory aggression. High ruminators, as measured by the DissipationRumination Scale (Caprara, 1986), were more aggressive than high dissipaters even after
partialing out emotional vulnerability and self-esteem threat.
Rumination has also been observed to act as a moderator between aggression and
other constructs. Rumination was identified as a moderator in a study exploring the
relationship between alcohol consumption, alcohol consumption expectancies, and
aggressive behavior. Participants completed measures of the above constructs. Analysis
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of self-report data indicated that, in addition to its role in displaced aggression, anger
rumination did act, along with aggression expectancies, to moderate the relationship
between alcohol consumption and alcohol related aggression (Borders, Barnwell, &
Earleywine, 2007).
In another example, Bushman (2002) induced rumination in a study involving
catharsis, rumination, and aggression. Participants in this study were provoked through
negative criticism of an essay they had written and were then shown a picture of the
supposed evaluator and told to think about him or her while hitting a punching bag. The
punching bag manipulation presented an opportunity for participants to cathartically
address negative feelings about their essay feedback. Participants then participated in a
competitive task in which they delivered a noxious stimulus (a loud noise) to an
opponent. The punching bag manipulation was effective in inducing anger rumination,
with participants reporting more anger after hitting the punching bag and thinking about
their evaluator. Participants who ruminated with the punching bag were found to be more
aggressive in a competitive task than those who did not, further supporting the connection
between anger rumination and aggression. Taken together, the above studies indicate a
general pattern of association between aggression and rumination.
This relationship between rumination and aggression has been hypothesized to
originate with the initial provocation. Provocations give rise to an increase in negative
affect, which in turn activates “a network of aggression-related thoughts and tendencies”
(Miller et al., 2003, p. 83). Rumination maintains this negative affect and thus continues
to activate this network of aggression-related cognitions long after the activation would
normally have dissipated (Miller et al., 2003).
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The Current Study
According to Miller’s (2003) theoretical model, the aggressive responding
observed in ruminators is the result of anger activation prolonged by rumination.
However, it is unclear what role the perseverative nature of ruminative thought plays in
aggression over and above the effects of anger. This is an area in which only limited
experimental research has been conducted. Most studies of perseverance and rumination
have centered on depressive rumination rather than anger rumination. Moreover, very
little laboratory research in general has been conducted on the motivation to exert effort
to aggress after provocation. The current study will examine the impact of anger
rumination on motivation to aggress.
The Taylor Aggression Paradigm (TAP) (Taylor, 1967) has been successfully
used to measure aggressive behavior in studies examining anger rumination (Bushman,
2002). The TAP measures aggression using a competitive reaction time paradigm cover
task. Participants compete in a number of reaction time trials against a fictitious
opponent. After each trial that the participant ostensibly wins, he or she is given the
option to select a level of aversive stimulus to deliver to their supposed opponent (e.g.,
loud noise or electric shock). Aggression level is measured by the intensity of aversive
stimulus selected by the participant during the reaction time trials.
A modified version of the TAP has been developed to examine whether restricting
access to a “weapon” would affect aggression in response to provocation (Broman-Fulks,
Hudson, Bobrycki,, Ratliff, Sloan, Bradley, Clark, & Wells, 2002). In order to select
increasingly aggressive levels of electric shock, participants had to press a button an
increasingly large number of times. This forced participants to “work harder” in order to
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select more aggressive shock levels. Preliminary findings indicated that, even in the face
of escalating provocation, participants chose less labor intensive levels of shock over
higher levels of shock that required more button presses to activate. Participants in a loweffort group wherein each shock option required only one button press to activate
responded to escalating provocation with escalating levels of electric shock. No
differences in shock selection were found between participants who believed that their
opponent had to exert effort to aggress and those who believed that their opponent could
select shocks freely. Overall, it appears that requiring a participant to exert effort to gain
access to more intense aggressive responses lowers the probability of the occurrence of
aggression. The current study will also use this paradigm to examine the relation between
anger rumination and aggression.
Study Rationale and Aims
As requiring effort to access a weapon has been initially shown to decrease
aggressive behavior, it logically follows that interventions that present a similar
requirement of effort (e.g., handgun waiting periods, decreasing access to weapons
among aggression-prone individuals) would decrease the likelihood of the occurrence of
aggressive behavior. The purpose of this study was to further examine the above
relationship between effort condition and aggressive behavior, specifically examining the
possible intervention of anger rumination in this relationship. As described above, anger
rumination has been shown to promote both aggression and possibly some perseverative
behavior. These qualities could potentially promote an increase in aggressive behavior
despite increased effort requirements. If indeed this is the case, findings could inform
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future interventions to prevent aggressive behavior such as screening for a tendency
toward anger rumination in individuals at risk to aggress.
Thus, this study examined the unique contribution of anger rumination over and
above trait anger on aggression as measured by TAP, when a higher level of effort to
aggress is required. To this end:
1. Levels of anger and anger rumination in study participants were obtained
through self-report measures.
2. All participants were angered using an anger-induction protocol (described
below)
3. Following anger induction, participants completed the TAP with either a higheffort or low-effort requirement to aggress. Participants were increasingly
provoked via shock feedback.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: As observed in Broman-Fulks et al. (2002) it is hypothesized that
requiring effortful responding will decrease aggressive responding even at high levels of
provocation.
Hypothesis 2: Because of the anger-sustaining nature of ruminative thought, it is
hypothesized that higher levels of anger rumination will uniquely predict higher levels of
aggression in response to provocation in the high-effort group. These effects are expected
to persist after the effects of anger are controlled.
Hypothesis 3: It is expected that anger rumination will not be uniquely associated
with aggression when trait anger is controlled in the low-effort condition. However, trait
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anger is expected to be positively associated with aggressive responding in this condition
controlling for anger rumination, especially under high levels of provocation.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants
A total of 150 undergraduate students participated in this study. Data from 27
participants were excluded after debriefing suggested that they were not fully deceived.
Of the remaining participants, 83 were female and 40 were male. Ages ranged from 1851 years (M = 20.9, SD = 4.6). 56.9% of participants identified as African-American,
39.8% identified at Caucasian, 1.6% identified as Hispanic, and 1.6% identified their race
as “other.” Volunteers were recruited to participate in a study on “Personality matching
and joint performance on a reaction time task.” This study title was used to mask the true
purpose of the study, and to provide a cover task for the false negative feedback used to
elicit anger rumination. Participants received credit in psychology courses in exchange
for participation.
Measures
Assessment of Anger Rumination.
Dissipation-Rumination Scale. Trait rumination was assessed using the
Dissipation-Rumination Scale (DRS; Caprara, 1986). The DRS is a 20-item measure of
anger rumination used to identify the tendency to either ruminate or dissipate anger. Five
of the 20 items are distracter items. The DRS is scored on a 6-point Likert-like scale with
responses ranging from completely false for me to completely true for me. This scale has
been validated through several experiments. The scale was validated experimentally, with
higher rumination scores predicting higher levels of aggression as long as 24 hours after
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provocation (Caprara, 1986). The DRS was the primary measure of anger rumination
used in this study. The Cronbach’s α from this administration of the scale was .91.
Assessment of Anger
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 – Trait Anger Scale. The Trait Anger
scale of the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999) was
used to measure trait anger. The STAXI-2 is a widely used 57-item measure of anger.
This scale measures state anger, trait anger, and anger expression. The trait anger scale is
10-item scale measuring respondents “general feelings” of anger. The full STAXI
displayed high internal consistency (α = .85), and the trait anger scale’s internal
consistency was comparable (α = .86). The STAXI-2 has been validated through strong
correlations with other measures of anger and hostility (Suris & Coccaro, 2008).
Differential Emotions Scale. The Differential Emotions Scale (DES; Izard, 1972)
was used as a very brief anger manipulation check following provocation. This scale is a
very brief visual analogue measure of mood states, including anger, happiness, sadness,
fear, and anxiety. Respondents rate a list of “feeling” words by marking a horizontal line
representing a continuum from not at all to very much. The respondent is instructed to
place a mark on the line indicating how much or little they are feeling that emotion at the
current moment. The scale is scored by measuring the area of line up to the mark made
by participants in increments of 1/10th of an inch.
Validation Measures of Anger Rumination
Two other measures of anger rumination, the Displaced Aggression Questionnaire
and the Anger Rumination Scale, were also administered in order to validate the DRS.
The DRS was used as the primary measure of anger rumination in this study because of
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its length, previous association with aggressive behavior (Caprara, 1986), and because
other available anger rumination scales measure other constructs in addition to anger
rumination. The psychometric properties of these two scales are described below.
Displaced Aggression Questionnaire. The DRS was validated in part through the
Displaced Aggression Questionnaire (DAQ; Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006). The
DAQ is composed of 31 items and is scored on a 7-point bi-polar Likert-type scale, with
responses ranging from extremely characteristic of me to extremely uncharacteristic of
me. It has been validated through a series of experimental paradigms with test scores
predicting actual displaced aggression in the laboratory, with beta weights ranging from
.26 to .34 (Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006). The scale is divided into three subscales:
“Anger Rumination” (10 items), composed of items measuring the tendency to remember
and dwell on previous provocations and anger-inducing events; “Revenge Planning” (11
items), composed of items asking about fantasies of revenge as well as beliefs and
behaviors related to revenge; and “Displaced Aggression” (10 items), composed of items
about taking out one’s anger on innocent others. The anger rumination scale and revenge
planning scale to a lesser degree are expected to be associated with DRS. The displaced
aggression scale is not predicted to be as strongly associated with the DRS because it is a
separate although related construct. Internal consistency for DAQ total scores (α = .97),
anger rumination (α = .95), revenge planning (α = .94), and displaced aggression (α =
.93) were all high.
Anger Rumination Scale. To further examine the validity of the DRS, a second
anger rumination scale was administered. The Anger Rumination Scale (ARS;
Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2006), is composed of 19 items and is scored on a 4-
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point Likert-type scale, with responses ranging from almost always to never. Validity was
established through correlation with other measures of anger and rumination
(Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2006) including the STAXI-II (r = .57) and Measure
of Negative Affectivity (r =.54).
The ARS is divided into four subscales. These subscales are “Understanding
Causes” (4 items), which relates to attempts why anger and anger provoking situations
occur; “Angry Memories” (5 items), which relates to the tendency to hold onto memories
of anger or anger provoking situations; “Angry Afterthoughts” (6 items), which involves
cognitively returning to memories of previous anger-provoking situations and continuing
to focus on their content; and “Thoughts of Revenge” (4 items), which relates to a
tendency to fantasize about getting revenge. All four of these subscales are expected to be
associated with the DRS. Internal consistency coefficients for were found to be strong
for the total ARS measure (α = .96), angry memories subscale (α = .91), angry
afterthoughts subscale (α = .92), understanding causes subscale (α = .80), and thoughts of
revenge subscale (α = .84).
Procedure
The participants were randomly assigned to one of two effort conditions. One
group completed the TAP with the high-effort (HE) shock selection requirement and the
other completed the TAP with the low-effort (LE) selection procedures in the paradigm.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, the researcher greeted the participant and escorted him or
her to a room labeled “Subject A” and informed him or her that the opponent had already
begun completing paper work. Informed consent was then obtained (see Appendix A).
After the informed consent process, the researcher informed the participant that he or she
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was “Subject A,” and would be working with Subject B in the adjoining room. The
participant then completed a set of demographic questionnaires.
Next, the researcher began a procedure designed to induce anger in the
participants. Two standard neuropsychology tasks (a computer version of the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Task and a pen-and-paper version of the Trail Making Task) were
administered. These tasks were not used as part of data analyses, but rather as part of the
anger induction. The purpose of these tasks was to provide an impetus for the
experimenter to provided false, presumably anger-inducing negative performance
feedback to participants. The DES was also administered following the completion of
these tasks. The researcher then told the participant that he (the researcher) “Needed to
compare both subjects’ test results to before beginning the reaction time task.” This
provided a cover-task for the false feedback. After a five minute delay, the researcher
returned to the participant’s room with a sheet of paper bearing an apparently hand-drawn
bell curve diagram which was given to the participant and ostensibly Subject B. The
researcher next attached finger tip electrodes to the index and middle fingers of the
participant’s non-dominant hand via Velcro strips. The participant was told, “Please hold
your hand still on the table for the rest of the task. You will use your other hand for the
reaction-time task, and to fill out a few remaining questions.”
The researcher then excused himself to go to the control room and read the
following script over an intercom:
Subjects A and B, we have completed just about everything in the study so far
except for the reaction time game. Results of almost all of the testing so far
indicates that the two of you are very similar. The only difference we found was
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on the card-matching test, which we believe is a measure intellectual capacity or
intelligence. If you look at the diagram that I put in each of your rooms, you will
notice that Subject A performed a bit below average, while Subject B performed a
little above average. Otherwise, your test performance was very similar. Now
then, we’re ready to go on with calibrating the reaction-time task.
Following the delivery of this information, the researcher began the shock
threshold procedure (see Appendix C). Increasing levels of electric shock (by 100
microamperes) were administered. The researcher stopped the procedure when the
participant rated the shock as definitely very unpleasant and did not want to receive any
higher level. This shock level was the upper shock pain threshold. The procedure was
then repeated for the fictitious opponent, using an audio recording to simulate the
opponent’s responses. In order to avoid confounding by gender, the participant interacted
with a same-sex opponent. This was accomplished by playing gender-matched audio files
and referring to the opponent as “he” or “she” throughout, as appropriate.
After the threshold procedure, the researcher played recorded instructions for the
TAP over the intercom (see Appendix C). Following the conclusion of these instructions,
the researcher then asked Subject A if he or she was ready to begin. At this point the
anger rumination induction commenced. After a brief pause, the researcher also asked if
Subject B was ready to continue. At this point, the researcher played a voice recording in
which Subject B said: “I’m ready, and I’m pretty sure I’m going to beat Subject A on the
reaction game just like I did on the intelligence test.” To prevent the participant from
responding to this induction before the TAP, the researcher immediately said, “Okay, I’m
going to turn off the intercom so we can get the task going. Please fill out the DES form
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once again to determine continued match and we’ll begin.” Upon completion of the DES,
the researcher began the TAP.
Note that that the anger induction procedure was piloted on 4 graduate students
prior to beginning data collection in order to gauge how anger-eliciting this induction was
(rated on a 6-point scale from not at all to extremely) and to determine whether or not
aspects of the script need to be modified. Responses ranged from 4-6. Some minor
modifications were made to the script in order to increase believability.
During the TAP, participants were ostensibly competing against an opponent at
holding down a spacebar and attempting to release it more quickly than their opponent
when prompted via a message on a computer screen. Participants were told that if they
were slower than the opponent they would receive an electric shock of an intensity
selected by the opponent. Participants were told that if participants were faster than their
opponent they would be given the option to deliver an electric shock to their opponent of
an intensity of their choosing. The participant used the computer’s keyboard to select a
shock. The justification given to participants for the use of electric shocks is that the
shocks are motivating sensory stimuli to increase performance in the reaction time task.
Shock levels ranged from 0-20, with the 10 shock being equal to the upper threshold
defined during the threshold task, the 9 shock being equal to 95% of this threshold, 8 to
90%, 7 to 85%, and so on. The 20 was described as representing “an extremely painful
shock twice the intensity of the pain threshold that could cause minor tissue damage that
will quickly heal.” Thus, the 20 was defined as an unequivocally aggressive response.
Participants may also select a 0 option, which delivers no shock to the opponent, although
this option has only infrequently been selected in previous research.
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Wins, losses, and opponent shock selections were pre–programmed and
computer-controlled. Participants were determined to “lose” on 50% of trials and “win”
on 50% of trials. Participants completed 28 trials with the opponent’s shocks becoming
increasingly more provocative. The 28 trials consisted of an initial trial followed by four
provocation blocks of six trials each. Average shock during the first block was 2.5 (2s
and 3s), followed by blocks averaging 5.5 (5s and 6s), 8.5 (8s and 9s), and 8.5.
Intermediate shock levels between the first three blocks (4 and 7) were used to smooth
the transition between blocks. Shock feedback of 20 from the opponent was included
between the third and fourth blocks. Of course, the participant was programmed to win
this trial, so the 20 shock was never administered. The inclusion of this trial was intended
to be highly provocative and to elicit counter-aggression.
In the high-effort group, participants were required to press the space bar an
increasing number of times to set higher shocks. Participants had to press the space bar
10 times to set a 1 shock, 20 times to set a 2 shock, 30 times to set a 3 shock, and so on to
200 times to select a 20 shock. Participants were informed via computer monitor about
the shock level they have earned access to. The participants were free to stop buttonpresses at any time once a particular shock level was reached. Participants in the loweffort TAP condition were able to access all shocks with equal effort by simply selecting
a shock choice with a single button press. Aggression was defined by the shock level
selected for the opponent to receive on trials the participant “wins.” Two shock indices
were used as outcome variables: a) average shock selected on each block, and b) number
of extreme (20) shocks selected per block.
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Following completion of the TAP, the participant completed a post-task
questionnaire, which included items asking about performance on the reaction time trials
and about his or her perceptions regarding the purpose of the experiment (Appendix B),
anger rumination measures, and the STAXI-2. The post-task questionnaire was designed
to determine if the deception necessary for the TAP was successful. Participants who did
not accept the cover task or know the true purpose of the study were excluded from the
data set for analysis purposes. Following completion of the post-task questionnaire,
participants were debriefed, asked not to share details with other participants and
dismissed.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Means, standard deviations, and measures of skew and kurtosis were computed
for all measures of anger rumination and anger rumination subscales, the STAXI-II Trait
Anger Scale, and both shock indices (Table 1). Chi square tests were performed in order
to determine if the participants in the two effort conditions differed as a function of
ethnicity and gender. No significant differences were found for either gender or ethnicity.
Independent samples t-tests were also performed to determine if participants in the high
and low effort conditions differed in their levels of age, trait anger, or anger rumination.
No differences between groups were found for trait anger or age. However, significant
between groups differences emerged among all three measures of anger rumination. DRS
total scores were significantly higher in the low-effort condition (M = 44.10, SD = 18.08)
than in the delayed access condition (M = 39.18, SD = 12.78; t [120] = 1.73, p < .05.
Similarly, DAQ total scores were significantly higher in the low-effort condition (M =
81.95. SD = 41.98) than in the delayed access condition (M = 41.98, SD = 29.37; t [120]
= 2.51, p < .05). Consistent with the other anger rumination measures, ARS scores were
higher in the low-effort condition (M = 37.84, SD = 15.56) than in the delayed access
condition (M = 30.72, SD = 11.12) by a significant margin, t (120) = 2.90, p < .05.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Measures

n

M

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

DRS

122

63.06

16.65

0.38

-0.31

DAQ

122

73.83

37.12

1.08

0.43

Anger Rumination

122

23.91

13.60

0.83

-0.25

Revenge Planning

122

24.36

15.36

1.38

1.10

Displaced Aggression 122

25.56

13.19

1.13

0.64

122

34.34

13.97

1.02

0.23

Angry Afterthoughts

122

10.84

5.04

0.92

-0.31

Thoughts of Revenge

122

6.33

2.92

1.53

1.93

Angry Memories

122

8.96

4.18

1.06

0.07

8.21

3.20

0.60

-0.45

ARS

Understanding
122
Causes
STAXI-II T

121

17.80

5.92

0.97

0.57

Mean Shock

123

4.96

2.22

-0.01

-0.01

Total 20s

123

1.36

3.92

4.60

22.77

Note. DAQ = Displaced Aggression Questionnaire, ARS = Anger Rumination Scale, DRS = DissipationRumination Scale, STAXI-II T = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-II Trait Anger Scale.

Bivariate Correlations
Bivariate correlations (Table 2) were computed between the mean shock level
selected across all trials, the total 20s selected across all trials, anger rumination measure
total scores (DAQ total score, ARS total score, and DRS total score) and Trait Anger as
measured by the STAXI. All measures of anger rumination and trait anger were
correlated positively, and both shock indices were positively correlated with each other,
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as expected. All measures of anger rumination except for DAQ Revenge Planning were
significantly correlated with average shock selected on the TAP, however, only the DRS
was significantly correlated with total 20 shocks selected.
DES Anger Pre/Post
Recall that this study included an anger induction component, in which participants
received false, negative feedback on a performance task and then were denigrated about
their supposed performance. In order to determine if this provocation effectively induced
anger in participants, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted examining state anger
as measured by the DES before and after participants received false feedback on their
WCST performance and heard the provocation sound clip. DES anger scores before
provocation (M = 3.84, SD = .71) were lower than scores following provocation (M =
6.25, SD = .94), and this difference was significant, F (1,119) = 9.91, p < .05. This
finding indicated that the provocation induction was successful in inducing state anger in
participants. A multiple regression was also conducted in order to determine if there was
any effect of trait anger or rumination proneness on the difference between pre and post
anger. This regression model did not significant predict a difference in anger intensity in
response to the induction based either on anger rumination or trait anger.

Table 2
Intercorrelations between Rumination Measures and Subscales, Anger Measures, and Aggression Measures
Measures
DRS
DAQ
D1
D2
D3
ARS
A1
A2
A3
A4
STAXI T
Mean Shock
Total 20s

DRS

DAQ

D1

D2

D3

ARS

A1

A2

A3

A4

STAXI

Mean Shock

---

.81**

.79**

.81**

.53**

.77**

.71**

.76**

.70**

.65**

.70**

.34**

.19*

---

.91**

.91**

.82**

.91**

.86**

.86**

.83**

.76**

.80**

.21*

.08

---

.78**

.62**

.91**

.87**

.79**

.86**

.76**

.72**

.22*

.04

---

.58**

.84**

.78**

.87**

.76**

.65**

.73**

.24**

.10

---

.64**

.61**

.59**

.55**

.58**

.65**

.09

.07

---

.95**

.89**

.91**

.87**

.72**

.25**

.07

---

.80**

.82**

.79**

.68**

.27**

.02

---

.77**

.70**

.67**

.25**

.14

---

.69**

.67**

.18*

.07

---

.60**

.20*

.03

---

.19*

.06

---

Total 20s

.52**
---

Note. DRS = Dissipation Rumination Scale, DAQ = Displaced Aggression Questionnaire, D1 = DAQ Anger Rumination, D2 = DAQ Revenge Planning, D3 =
DAQ Displaced Aggression, ARS = Anger Rumination Scale, A1 = ARS Angry Afterthoughts, A2 = ARS Thoughts of Revenge, A3 = ARS Angry Memories,
A4 = ARS Understanding Causes, STAXI T= State Trait Anger Expression Inventory II – Trait Anger Scale
* p < .05, ** p < .0
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DRS Validation
In order to examine the validity of the Dissipation-Rumination Scale, a two step
hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed with DRS total scores as the
dependent variable. The STAXI-II Trait Anger subscale was entered in step one. The
second step included subscales from the Anger Rumination Scale (Understanding Causes,
Angry Memories, Thoughts of Revenge, and Angry Afterthoughts) and subscales from
the Displaced Aggression Questionnaire (Anger Rumination, Revenge Planning, and
Displaced Aggression). Results of this regression can be viewed in Table 3, and β
weights and associated statistics can be viewed in Table 4.
Table 3
Significance of ARS Validation Regression Model
Step

R

R2

∆F

df (reg.)

df (res.)

1

.70 .50 115.47*

1

118

2

.86 .73

7

111

14.00*

Note. df reg. = degrees of freedom (regression), df res. = degrees of freedom (residual)
*p < .001

Table 4
B Weights and Associated Statistics for DRS Validation Regression Model
Predictor

∆R2

Step 1

.50*

Trait Anger
Step 2

β

.70*
.24*

t

10.75
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Table 4 (continued).
∆R2

β

t

ARS Angry Afterthoughts

-.09

-0.79

ARS Thoughts of Revenge

.12

1.07

-.13

-1.18

ARS Understanding Causes

.03

0.31

DAQ Anger Rumination

.46*

3.67

DAQ Revenge Planning

.41*

3.73

Predictor

ARS Angry Memories

DAQ Displaced Aggression

-.05

-0.74

Note. *p < .001

Both steps 1 and 2 predicted significant variance in anger rumination as measured
by the DRS. As can be seen in Table 3, trait anger was found to significantly predict
anger rumination in Step 1, t = 10.75, p < .001, β = .70. This is consistent with theoretical
expectations, given the interrelatedness of anger and anger rumination as constructs. This
significant overlap between anger and anger rumination, and the anger rumination
subscales can be seen in Table 5.
Table 5
Step 1 Excluded Variables DRS Validation Regression Model
Predictor

β in

T

Step 1
ARS Angry Afterthoughts

.43*

7.44

ARS Thoughts of Revenge

.52*

7.01
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Table 5 (continued).
β in

Predictor

t

ARS Angry Memories

.41*

5.10

ARS Understanding Causes

.33*

0.31

DAQ Anger Rumination

.58*

3.67

DAQ Revenge Planning

.63*

3.73

DAQ Displaced Aggression

.11

1.32

Note. *p < .001

If entered in the first step, all subscales except DAQ displaced aggression would
be significantly predictive of DRS total score. It appears that much of this overlap is due
to trait anger. In Step 2, only two DAQ subscales, Anger Rumination (t = 3.67, p < .001,
β = .46), and Revenge Planning (t = 3.73, p <.001, β = .41), were found to uniquely
predict 24% of the variance in DRS total score over and above the effects of trait anger
observed in step 1. The change in R2 between steps 1 and 2 (∆R2 = .24, p < .001) is
significant and provides qualified support to the idea that the DRS is measuring a
separate rumination construct beyond anger alone that seems uniquely associated with
revenge planning and anger rumination as measured by the DAQ.
Multiple Regressions
Description of Multiple Regression Model
Two sets of multiple regression analyses were tested, with each set using a
different shock index to measure aggression. The first group of regressions used the
average level of shocks selected across TAP trials, whereas the second group of
regressions used the total number of 20-shocks selected during TAP trials. Total DRS
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score, a continuous variable, was selected as a measure of anger rumination. The traitanger STAXI-II subscale, also a continuous variable, was used to measure trait anger.
Effort condition and gender were both dummy coded (0 = low-effort condition, 1 = higheffort condition; 1 = male, 2 = female). To test the moderation effects postulated in
hypothesis 2, an interaction term between effort condition and anger rumination was
generated. Similarly, an interaction term between trait anger and effort condition was
generated to test the moderation effect expected by hypothesis 3. Attempts to correct for
skew in DRS and STAXI-II data via transformations did not significantly affect the
outcome of the analyses. Multiple regression was selected as the data analysis procedure
because of the continuous nature of the rumination and trait anger scales used, However,
because the dependent variable (aggression across provocation blocks) was a repeated
measure, it was impossible to analyze the data using a single multiple regression. In order
to address this issue, the “sum/difference regression method” (Giancola, 2004, p. 548)
was used.
Recall that, in order to provoke participants, increasingly severe shock feedback
was presented in four blocks. In order to examine this within-subjects variable using this
regression method, shocks selected during blocks 1 and 2 were summed into a single low
provocation block, and shocks selected during blocks 3 and 4 were summed into a single
high-provocation block. Using these high and low provocation blocks, two dependent
variables were derived. Low and high blocks were summed into a single term
representing shocks selected on all TAP trials (DV1), which was used to examine all
between subjects effects, independent of provocation. To derive the second dependent
variable (DV2), the difference between shocks selected in the high and low provocation
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trials (High Block – Low Block) was calculated. DV2 allows for the examination of the
within-subjects effects of provocation. This technique has been used previously and
established as a multiple regression equivalent of repeated measures ANOVA; removing
the need to dichotomize continuous variables (Giancola, 2004). Each of these DVs was
regressed onto the same three step regression model. The model is as follows: Gender
was included in the first step, effort condition, anger rumination and trait anger were
added in the second step, and the interaction terms (anger rumination x effort condition
and trait anger x effort condition) were entered in the third step.
In addition to the above, two more DVs were calculated and used in additional
regression analyses. These regressions examined between-subjects effects at high and
low levels of provocation individually, with the low-provocation DV being the sum
provocation blocks 1 and 2, and the high-provocation DV being the sum of blocks 3 and
4. As above, the same three step regression model was used for the Low/High
regressions. Gender was included in the first step, effort condition, anger rumination and
trait anger were added in the second step, and the interaction terms (anger rumination x
effort condition and trait anger x effort condition) were entered in the third step.
In summary, two sets of four multiple regressions, each with a different dependent
variable were conducted. The first set of regressions used mean shock as an aggression
index and the second set used total 20 shocks as an aggression index. The first regression
in each set used DV1 (blocks 1 and 2 + blocks 3 and 4) as its dependent variable. The
second regression in each set used DV2 (blocks 3 and 4 – blocks 1 and 2) as the
dependent variable. The third regression in each set used the low provocation blocks
(block 1 + block 2) as a dependent variable, and the fourth regression used the high
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provocation blocks (block 3 + block 4) as the dependent variable. Thus, a total of eight
regressions were computed in the study (2 shock indices x 4 DVs).
Regressions Using Mean Shock as a Shock Index
DV1/DV2 regressions. Regression models examining mean shocks selected
during the TAP as DVs was conducted first. DV1 was regressed onto the 3-step multiple
regression model. As noted above, this model examines between groups main and
interaction effects independent of within groups effects. DV1 regression model results are
presented in the left side of Table 6 and β weights and associated statistics are presented
in the left side of Table 7.
The second step of the regression (entry of main effects of effort condition, trait
anger, and anger rumination) was the only step that accounted for a significant amount of
variance in mean shock across provocation groups F (4,115) = 11.96, p < .001, R2 = .24.
Effort condition (t = -5.42, p < .001, β = -.43) was found to be a significant predictor of
mean shock in this model, with participants in the high effort condition selecting lower
mean shocks than those assigned to the low-effort group.
Table 6
Significance of DV1/DV2 Regression Model – Mean Shock
DV1
R2

∆F

Step

R

1

.10

.01

1.25

2

.54

.29

3

.55

.31

DV2
df reg.

R2

R

1

118

.15

.02

2.72

1

118

15.38*

3

115

.38

.15

5.56*

3

115

.93

2

113

.41

.17

1.61

2

113

Note. df reg. = degrees of freedom (regression), df res. = degrees of freedom (residual)
* p < .001

∆F

df res.

df reg.

df res.
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Table 7
β Weights and Associated Statistics for DV1/DV2 Multiple Regression Model – Mean
Shock

DV1
Predictor

∆R2

Step 1

.01

Gender
Step 2

β

DV2
T

β

t

-.15

-1.66

-.15

-1.65

.02
.10

1.12

.28**

Gender

∆R2

.12*
.60

0.75

Effort Condition

-.43**

-5.42

-.35**

-4.02

Trait Anger

-.13

-1.18

-.04

-0.36

3.05

.04

0.04

Rumination
Step 3

.35*
.03

Gender

.02
.05

0.64

-.14

-1.58

Effort Condition

-.71*

-2.62

-.41

-1.37

Trait Anger

-.27

-1.71

.13

0.76

2.77

-.16

-0.96

Rumination

.42*

Rum. X Effort

-.16

-0.50

.60

1.77

Ang. X Effort

.44

1.28

-.53

-1.40

Note. * p < .01, ** p <.001

Anger rumination (t = 3.05, p < .01, β = .35) also accounted for unique variance in
mean shock independent of provocation, with higher levels of rumination associated with
higher levels of average shock selected. Trait anger and gender were not uniquely
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predictive of mean shock, and no significant moderation effects were noted for either
interaction term.
In order to examine the effect of provocation on the above relationships, DV2 was
regressed onto the same 3-step model described above. Again, only the second step of the
regression accounted for a significant amount of variance in mean shock between the
high and low provocation blocks F(4, 115) = 4.93, p < .01, R2 = .15. Effort condition
significantly accounted for a unique portion of the variance in mean shock selected
between high and low provocation blocks. The dampening effect on aggression in the
high-effort condition, noted in the DV1 model, was found to persist despite provocation
(t = -4.02, p < .001, β = -.35). Conversely, the significant, aggression-promoting effect
noted for anger rumination in the DV1 model was not noted in this model: anger
rumination did not account for a significant amount of the variance between provocation
blocks. Similarly, gender, trait anger, and neither interaction term were insignificant.
Low/high provocation regressions – mean shocks. To examine the variables at
each level of provocation, a separate multiple regression analysis was conducted at each
of the (low/high) levels of provocation. In the first of these analyses, the mean shocks
selected during the block of low provocation trials were regressed onto the same 3-step
regression model used above (recall: Step 1: Gender; Step 2: Effort Condition,
Rumination, Trait Anger; Step 3: Effort/Rumination, Effort/Anger interaction terms).
Results of these regressions for mean shock are presented in Table 8 and β weights and
associated statistics are presented in Table 9.
Both the first step (F (1, 118) = 4.32, p < .05, R2= .04) and second step (F (4,
115) = 8.62, p < .001, R2= .23) of this regression were significantly predictive of
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aggression across the trials that compose the low provocation block. In the first step,
gender was found to predict unique variance in aggression (t = 2.08, p < .05, β = .19),
with men selecting higher levels of shock on average than women.
Table 8
Significance of Low/High Multiple Regression Model – Mean Shock
Low
R2

∆F

Step

R

1

.19

.04

4.32*

2

.48

.23

3

.51

.26

High
df reg.

R2

∆F

df res.

R

1

118

.03

.00

9.73**

3

115

.54

.29 15.53**

2.24

2

113

.54

.01

df reg.

0.09

0.43

df res.

1

118

3

115

2

113

Note. df reg. = degrees of freedom (regression), df res. = degrees of freedom (residual)
* p <.05,** p < .001

In the second step, both effort condition (t = -3.66, p < .001, β = -.30) and
rumination (t = 3.08, p < .01, β = .36) significantly predicted aggression. High-effort
group members selected lower shocks than their low-effort counterparts, and higher anger
rumination scores again predicted higher aggression scores. No significant effects were
noted for trait anger or for the Effort x Rumination interaction term. The Effort x Trait
Anger interaction term accounted for a significant amount of unique variance in Step 3,
but the entry of the interaction terms in Step 3 did not significantly contribute to the
model on the whole (∆F= 2.24, p > .05, R2 = .03) giving this finding questionable
importance.
In the final regression in this set, mean shocks selected during the high
provocation trials were regressed onto the same three step model. Results are depicted on
right side of Tables 8 and 9. Only the second step was significant F (4, 115) = 11.68, p <
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.001, R2= .29. As in the low provocation block, participants assigned to the high-effort
group (t = -5.85, p < .001, β = -.47) selected lower levels of shock on average and
participants who indicated higher levels of rumination (t = 2.53, p < .05, β = .29) selected
higher levels of shock. No significant effects were noted for gender, trait anger, or either
interaction term.
Table 9
β Weights and Associated Statistics for Low/High Multiple Regression Model – Mean Shock
Low Provocation
Predictor

∆R2

Step 1

.04*

Gender
Step 2

β

High Provocation
t

2.08

.20***
1.66

Effort Condition

-.30***

-3.66

Trait Anger

-.12

-1.06

Step 3

.36**

.03

0.30

-.00

-0.05

-.47***
-.12

3.08

.03

Gender

t

.29***
.14

Rumination

β

.00
.19*

Gender

∆R2

.29*

-5.85
-1.07
2.53

.01
.13

1.52

-.01

-0.10

Effort Condition

-.59

-2.10

-.71*

-2.59

Trait Anger

-.36

-2.23

-.17

-1.05

Rumination

.54***

3.48

.28*

1.81

Rum. X Effort

-.47

-1.47

.09

0.29

Ang. X Effort

.76

2.12

.16

0.47

Note. * p < .05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001
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Regressions Using 20 Shock as a Shock Index
DV1/DV2 regressions – 20 shocks. Recall that, during the presentation of TAP
instructions, participants were told that setting a 20-level shock for their opponent would
be severely painful and could cause mild tissue damage, thus the selection of a 20 shock
was considered definitely aggressive. In order to corroborate results observed using mean
shock, the number of 20 shocks selected was used as a second index of aggression. Both
total 20s across provocation blocks (DV1) and the difference between the number of 20s
selected at the low and high provocation blocks (DV2) were regressed onto the same
three-step regression model described above.
DV1 regression model results are presented in the left side of Table10 and β
weights and associated statistics are presented in the left side of Table 11. The general
pattern of results observed for DV1 using the mean shock aggression index is maintained
in the current regression as well. The second step was the only one of the three to
significantly predicted the number of 20 shocks selected across all provocation blocks F
(4, 115) = 2.96, p <.05, R2 = .09.
Table 10
Significance of DV1/DV2 Regression Model – Total 20 Shocks
DV1
R2

∆F

Step

R

1

.15

.02

2.66

2

.31

.09

3

.35

.08

DV2
df reg.

R2

R

1

118

.02

.00

0.03

1

118

3.01*

3

115

.24

.06

2.38

3

115

1.88

2

113

.29

.09

1.69

2

113

Note. df reg. = degrees of freedom (regression), df res. = degrees of freedom (residual)
* p < .05

∆F

df res.

df reg.

df res.
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Table 11
β Weights and Associated Statistics for DV1/DV2 Multiple Regression Model – Total 20
Shocks

DV1
Predictor
Step 1

∆R2

β

DV2
t

.02

Gender
Step 2

β

T

.15

0.16

.00
.15

1.63

.07*

Gender

∆R2

.06
.11

1.21

.05

0.56

Effort Condition

-.18†

1.94

-.18†

-1.98

Trait Anger

-.16

-1.26

.21

1.62

Rumination

.27*

2.09

-.20

-1.50

Step 3

.03

.03

Gender

.11

1.21

.06

0.64

Effort Condition

.17

0.55

-.24

-0.78

Trait Anger

-.26*

-1.47

.40*

2.22

Rumination

.45**

2.67

-.41*

-2.35

Rum. X Effort

-.63*

-1.81

.64

1.82

Ang. X Effort

.26

0.66

-.57

-1.43

Note. † = Approaches Significance, * p < .05, ** p <.001

Rumination again accounted for a significant portion of unique variance in the
model (t = 2.09, p < .05, β = .27), indicating that as anger rumination increases the
number of 20s selected increases as well. Effort condition did not explain a significant
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amount of unique variance in 20 shocks, but it did approach significance (t = -1.94, p >
.05, β = -.18). This result suggested that participants in the high-effort condition may
have selected fewer 20 shocks, but it cannot be stated with 95% certainty. Consistent with
findings from the mean shock DV1 model, gender, trait anger, and the Anger x Effort and
Rumination x Effort interaction terms did not significantly contribute to the model.
Results for DV2 are listed in the right side of Table 10. β weights and associated
statistics are presented in the right side of Table 11. No significant linear relationship
emerged when DV2 was regressed onto the model using total 20s as an aggression index.
Low/high provocation regressions – 20 shocks. To examine the variables at each
level of provocation, a separate multiple regression was conducted at each (low/high)
level of provocation. In the first regression, Total 20 shocks selected during the block of
low provocation trials were regressed onto the same 3-step regression model used in
previous analyses (Step 1: Gender; Step 2: Effort Condition, Rumination, Trait Anger;
Step 3: Effort/Rumination, Effort/Anger interaction terms). Results of this regression are
presented in the left side of Table 12 and B weights and associated statistics are presented
in the left side of Table 13.
Only the second step of the regression significantly predicted aggressive behavior
F(3, 115) = 2.60, p < .05, R2 = .08. Only rumination was uniquely predictive of
aggression in this step (t = 2.48, p < .05, β = .32) with higher rumination scores
promoting the selection of more 20 shocks. Gender, effort condition and the interaction
between trait anger and effort condition did not uniquely account for aggressive behavior
in the model. Trait anger and the interaction between rumination and effort condition
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were both significant in the third step, but that step did was not significantly predictive of
aggression in the total model.
Table 12
Significance of Low/High Multiple Regression Model – Total 20 Shocks
Low
R2

∆F

Step

R

1

.14

.02

2.27

2

.29

.08

3

.36

.13

High
df reg.

R2

∆F

df res.

R

df reg.

1

118

.14

.02

2.50

1

118

2.68*

3

115

.31

.10

3.21*

3

115

2.88

2

113

.33

.11

0.91

2

113

Note. df reg. = degrees of freedom (regression), df res. = degrees of freedom (residual)
* p < .05

Results of the high provocation block regression, depicted in the right sides of
tables 12 and 13, differed somewhat from the previous regression. Again, only the second
step in the model was a significant predictor of aggressive behavior F(3, 115) = 3.21, p <
.05, R2 = .10. However, in contrast to the results of the low-provocation block regression,
effort condition (t = -2.46, p < .05, β = -.22) uniquely predicted the number of 20 shocks
selected by participants, with high-effort group members selecting significantly lower
numbers of 20s. Gender, anger rumination, trait anger, and the interaction terms did not
account for a significant portion of unique variance in the model.

df res.
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Table 13
β Weights and Associated Statistics for Low/High Multiple Regression Model – Total 20
Shocks
Low Provocation
Predictor

∆R2

Step 1

.02

Gender
Step 2

β

High Provocation
t

∆R2

β

t

.02
.14

1.51

.06*

.14

1.58

.08*

Gender

.09

0.98

-.12

1.32

Effort

-.11

-1.22

-.22*

-2.46

-.22

-1.73

-.09

-0.07

2.48

.19

1.49

Condition
Trait Anger
Rumination
Step 3

.32*
.04

.01

Gender

.09

0.95

.12

1.33

Effort

.24

0.79

.08

0.27

-.37*

-2.14

-.12

-0.67

3.33

.30

1.74

Condition
Trait Anger
Rumination

.56**

Rum. X Effort

-.80*

-2.33

-.39

-1.11

Ang. X Effort

.43

1.10

.06

0.16

* p < .05, ** p <.001
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Interpretation of Findings
The purpose this study was to examine the relationship between anger rumination,
provocation, and aggression in two conditions: one condition requiring a low level of
effort to aggress and one condition requiring a high level of effort to aggress. It was
hypothesized that a) participants in the high effort condition would respond with less
aggression despite provocation; b) higher levels of anger rumination would uniquely
increase aggressive responding in the high effort group over and above the effects of trait
anger; and c) trait anger would be positively associated with aggressive responding in the
low-effort condition controlling for trait anger, especially under high levels of
provocation.
In order to test these hypotheses, anger rumination was measured using the
Dissipation-Rumination Scale, a continuous self-report measure of anger rumination.
This scale was validated via a two step multiple regression analysis incorporating a
measure of trait anger, and then two other scales related to anger rumination. Results of
this regression indicated qualified support for the validity of the DRS, with subscales
measuring anger rumination and revenge planning predicting a significant amount of the
variance in DRS scores over and above the effects of trait anger.
Aggression was measured via two indices: mean level of electric shock selected
by participants and by the number of level 20 shocks selected by participants. Data were
analyzed using a series of eight multiple regression analyses, examining the relationships
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among variables independent of provocation, within provocation blocks, and at each level
of provocation separately.
Hypothesis 1 was supported in all analyses using the mean shock index.
Requiring increasing effort to aggress caused a significant reduction in mean shock
independent of provocation, within provocation blocks, and at low and high levels of
provocation. However, hypothesis 1 was only partially supported using total 20 shocks
as an aggression index. Independent of provocation, effort group membership closely
approached statistical significance, but no significant effect was found within
provocation blocks. Results were similarly mixed at each provocation level. There was no
effect for effort group membership at the low provocation level, whereas high effort
group membership decreased the number of 20 shocks selected under high provocation.
Hypothesis 2 was not fully supported using either shock index. Across shock
indices, higher levels of anger rumination were found to promote higher levels of
aggression independent of provocation, and a similar aggression-promoting effect was
noted in both low and high provocation conditions. However, anger rumination was not
found to significantly affect the difference in aggression between low and high
provocation blocks. Also unsupported was the postulated relationship among aggression,
rumination, and effort condition postulated in hypothesis 2. Rumination was not found to
increase or maintain aggression in the high-effort condition and, moreover, was not found
to moderate the relationship between effort condition and aggression in any of the
regressions.
Hypothesis 3 was unsupported. Trait anger was not a significant predictor of
aggression at high levels of provocation or in any of the other regression models.
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Additionally, there was no significant interaction noted between trait anger and effort
condition. It is unclear why trait anger was not a significant predictor of aggression in any
of the regression models, given the theoretical association between anger and aggression.
It is possible that there was not a wide enough range in anger among participants in this
study. Levels of trait anger among study participants were generally skewed leftward,
suggesting relatively low levels of anger. The affect on aggression may have been more
profound had more individuals identified severe or pathological levels of anger.
The above findings further support the aggression dampening effect of the
required effort condition noted in Broman-Fulks and colleagues (2008) persisted in this
current study as well, although more dramatically when mean shock was the aggression
index. This effect appeared robust enough to overcome the aggression promoting effects
of both provocation and anger rumination; although it should be noted that anger
rumination did promote aggressive behavior. This is consistent with previous
rumination/aggression research (Bushman et al., 2005; Denson, Pedersen, & Miller
2006).
The aggression decreasing effect of required effort was more questionable when
the number of 20 shocks selected was used as an aggression index. Effort group
membership was not entirely predictive of 20 shocks selected in the DV1 condition and
not at all predictive of total 20 shocks selected in the DV2 condition. Group membership
was also not predictive of aggression in the low provocation block, but was significantly
predictive in the high provocation block. This finding could be accounted for by the
general rarity of the selection of the 20 shock at the low provocation level, with only
9.8% of participants selecting a 20 shock in this block of trials. In contrast to this, a
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significant aggression-decreasing effect was noted for group membership at the high
provocation level, at which 30.1% of participants, having been repeatedly provoked by
the opponent, selected 20 shocks. This suggests that there may be something different
about the subset of participants who elected to set 20 shocks preemptively (i.e. prior to
being provoked). These participants may not react in the same way to being required to
exert effort to aggress as those who set 20 shocks following provocation.
Also of note was the role, or lack thereof, of gender in predicting aggressive
behavior. Gender was only found to account for a unique portion of variance in
aggression when low-provocation group mean shocks were regressed onto the 3 step
regression model. This is consistent with Bettencourt and Miller’s (1996) research on
gender and aggression, as male/female differences in aggression tend to disappear
following a provocation. The lack of gender effects in other low provocation/provocation
independent analyses could be accounted for by the relatively uneven balance of genders
(33% males vs. 67% females).
Contrary to expectations, increased ruminative thought did not promote increased
aggression on the TAP in the high effort condition. There are several possible
explanations for this finding. As noted above, the inconvenience of the high effort
manipulation may have simply overcome any added perseveration promoted by higher
levels of rumination. It is also possible that the perseveration that characterizes
ruminative thought (e.g., repeatedly focusing on anger-provoking situations, not allowing
angry feelings to dissipate over time) is markedly different from the kind of perseverative
behavior that would result in a study participant continually responding to an effortful
task. In other words, although high ruminators may continue to think perseveratively
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about their anger, and even aggress more readily and intensely, they may not perseverate
behaviorally in order to aggress. Additionally, it is also possible that the cover task: a test
of reaction time was itself distracting enough to dissipate some of the angry rumination,
although this is unlikely, given the competitive nature of the task and the frequent
provocation shocks from the supposed opponent.
The finding that membership in the high-effort group decreases aggressive
responding was clearly established through the above analyses. What is somewhat less
clear is the “active ingredient” in the high-effort condition that resulted in this decrease.
This paper has conceptualized “effort” as causing the decrease, but it is also possible that
the decrease in selected shock could be the result of the increased time required to
respond. High effort condition participants who selected all, or nearly all, 20 shocks
invested a comparatively larger amount of time in the TAP (up to 40 minutes) than those
who selected lower shocks (~20 minutes). Part of the decrease in aggression due to the
high-effort condition could represent participants not only finding the repetitive task
aversive or boring, but also wanting to complete the study as quickly as possible in order
to attend to other engagements. This may have been especially true during the high
provocation block, which was presented during the second half of the TAP’s 28 trials.
Questions also remain about the universality of the aggression-dampening effects
observed in this study. A variety of antecedents of aggressive behavior exist, DSM-IV
TR (APA, 2000), for example, lists identifies pathological anger, irritability, or
potentially aggressive behavior as associated features of a variety of different psychiatric
disorders (e.g., Bipolar Disorder, Conduct Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder,
Intermittent Explosive Disorder). Additionally, alcohol intoxication or other disinhibiting
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stimuli can also serve as precursors to aggression (McCloskey & Berman, 2003).
Requiring high levels of effort could potentially be more or less effective in decreasing
aggressive behavior depending on the antecedent to aggression. Consider, for example,
disorders in which aggressive responding is associated with impulsivity such as Bipolar
Disorder or Intermittent Explosive Disorder. Theoretically, individuals with these
diagnoses could potentially be more affected by the high effort-condition manipulation,
either due to dissipation of the impulsive aggression, or through the impulsive selection
of a more easily obtained low level shock. A similar effect would be expected in
participants in a substance-induced state of disinhibition. Conversely, individuals who
engage in more planful, instrumental aggressive behavior, (e.g., Antisocial Personality
Disorder, Conduct Disorder) may be less affected by effort manipulations. Further
research into these variations could help to further refine the understanding of the
relationship between aggression and required effort.
Potential Contributions of the Current Study
One central question in interpreting the above results is how applicable these
findings are to real-world aggression compared to aggression as measured in the
laboratory by the TAP. Although the use of a laboratory paradigm does limit the study’s
ecological validity, the finding that denying easy access to a means to aggression tends to
lower aggression does have applications to a variety of real world issues. Perhaps the
prototypical example is gun control legislation, in which interventions such as a waiting
periods or background checks, create situations in which potential firearm buyers must
exert significant effort in order to access a weapon. The effectiveness of requiring an
exertion of effort to aggress in decreasing aggressive responding, regardless of factors
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such as tendency to ruminate on anger, provocation, or increased aggression, would
appear to support the theoretical soundness of such interventions.
These findings have clinical implications in addition to the aforementioned public
policy implications. Uncontrolled, pathological anger has been implicated as an
antecedent to aggressive behavior (Bettencourt et al., 2006). This study’s findings could
support and inform treatment or risk management for psychiatric disorders associated
with pathological anger, irritability, or aggression. Such interventions could include
determining whether or not patients who are at risk to aggress own or have access to
weapons; and negotiating, either with patients or family members, to make access more
restricted or difficult (e.g., unloading guns, gun locks, locking knife drawers, etc). As
discussed above, these interventions may be more successful with patients who
experience aggressive behavior related to impulsivity.
Other contributions of the current study include the design of a novel paradigm
for the induction of anger in the laboratory. Although previous studies have used negative
feedback as a means of anger provocation previously, this study is the first to integrate
that feedback into a laboratory paradigm of aggression measurement. This study also
contributed to the body of evidence validating the Dissipation-Rumination Scale as a
valid measurement of anger rumination.
Limitations of the Current Study
A central limitation of the current study was the complexity and conventions of
the provocation cover task and anger rumination induction. In order for data from a given
participant to usable, that participant was be required to believe both that they were
competing against another, provoking individual, and that they were not involved in a
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task measuring aggression. Given the subject pool, undergraduate psychology students,
many participants were able to guess, at least partially, the true purpose of the study. This
required the rejection of a larger than average number of participants (27), lowering
power.
Another limitation involved the nature of the available anger rumination
measures. The measures of anger rumination used in this study asked essentially
retrospective questions about participants’ anger rumination experiences (e.g., “I have
had times when I could not stop being pre-occupied with a particular
conflict”[Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2001]). However, these measures do not
measure current anger rumination in vivo. Although there was a manipulation check in
this study to measure anger, the current study’s design did not provide for an opportunity
to include a manipulation check for the occurrence of rumination itself.
Future Research and Possible Variations
The high-effort/low-effort modification of the Taylor Aggression Paradigm is a
promising area of potential future research. Other potential moderating variables
including psychopathy could be explored using the same, or similar, research design. As
previously mentioned, this relationship may function differently depending on the
antecedents of aggressive behavior. A study comparing impulsive aggressors to
instrumental aggressors using the high/low effort TAP could provide further information
on the nature of factors affecting the relationship between aggression and effort
condition. This research study could resemble the current study but incorporate a rewardbased system in order to provoke instrumental aggression.
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Additionally, in order to address the above-noted lack of an in vivo measure of
rumination, a longitudinal component could be added to future aggression/anger
rumination studies in order to better capture the long-term nature of anger rumination.
Participants could be provoked via verbal insult and then invited back the following day
at which time their level of anger would be assessed. This would give some idea of which
individuals were actually ruminating. Alternatively, a periodic measure of anger during
the task could be built into the SAP protocol, which would also better measure
rumination in vivo. This could also involve further refining and testing the anger
induction paradigm developed for this study (e.g., further testing of provocative language
in order to maximize anger-induction while maintaining believability). A future study
could incorporate continuous real-time feedback from the supposed participant (or an
actual confederate) in order to continue to activate anger-related thoughts and feelings.
Finally, given some of the questions about the connection between the perseverative
nature of ruminative thought and perseverative behavior, research could be conducted
further examining the effects of anger rumination on executive functioning. This could
begin with some initial analyses of Wisconsin Card Sorting Test data collected during the
provocation induction.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship among anger
rumination, provocation, and aggressive behavior under two conditions: one requiring
significant effort to aggress and one in which aggression required little to no effort. The
main finding was that although anger rumination was associated with aggression,
requiring significant effort in order to aggress decreased aggressive responding as
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measured by mean shock even at high levels of provocation, trait anger, and anger
rumination.
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APPENDIX A
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI
CONSENT DOCUMENT FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
TITLE OF STUDY: PERSONALITY MATCHING AND JOINT PERFORMANCE ON
A REACTION TIME TASK
PARTICIPANT NAME __________________________________________________
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY? The purpose of this study is to obtain a
better understanding of how personality similarities affect a person’s reaction time during
an interactive game. If you agree to be in this study, you may be asked to answer some
questions about your feelings and memories, be exposed to electrical stimuli, perform
some tasks, and answer questions in response to your performance on these tasks. This
study is part of a doctoral dissertation by Joshua Bullock M.A., and Dr. Mitchell Berman
is supervising the project.
WHAT WILL I DO? You will take part in a reaction time task that involves the use of
mild to moderate electrical stimulation (electric shock). You will take part in twentyeight individual reaction time trials against another participant each of which may end
with you receiving electrical stimulation. The highest possible shock that you can receive
may be unpleasant or painful, and should your partner choose to select an extreme shock,
you may experience some tissue damage which should heal quickly. You will also
perform some other tasks that resemble card games or line tracing. You will also be asked
to complete a number of questions about your feelings and behaviors. The entire study
will take about one hour or a bit longer to complete. If you have recently used marijuana
or a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (e.g., Lexapro, Celexa, Paxil, Prozac etc.) you
cannot participate in this study.
WHAT ARE THE RISKS TO ME? Risks inherent in this study are minimal. You may
experience mild to moderate discomfort from the electrical stimulation used in the
attention task. If your partner chooses to select an extreme shock (20), you may
experience some minor tissue damage which should heal quickly. You may get bored or
tired during the sessions. Some questions may be sensitive in nature. For example, we
will ask you about feelings and emotions you may have had in the past. You may feel
uneasy after answering these questions.
WHO BENEFITS? The information obtained in this study will not directly benefit you.
However, the results of the study may provide information about human personality and
reaction time.
You will receive course credit for being in the study. You will receive four points of
Experimetrix credit for your participation. If you do not meet the criteria for this study, or
you choose not to participate, other research options for obtaining credit are available.
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Credit may also be obtained through non-research options at your course instructor’s
discretion. You may prefer to discuss other options for obtaining credit with your
instructor.
WHO WILL SEE MY INFORMATION? All information obtained during this study is
confidential. That is, we protect the privacy of subjects by withholding their names and
other identifying information from all persons not connected with this study. All
information will be kept in a locked file cabinet or on an access-controlled computer.
Data that we may report in scientific journals will not include any information that
identifies you as a subject in this study. Five years after the final publication of this study,
all study information will be destroyed.
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary.
You may withdraw from being a research subject anytime, even after we tell you about
the study. There is no penalty for withdrawing at any time. If you withdraw from this
study voluntarily, you will receive course credit only for those aspects of the research that
you have completed. Students here receive one “research credit” for each half-hour of
participation. If you decide to not participate, you will receive one-half credit. If you stop
after a half hour, you will receive one credit. If you finish the study, you will receive four
credits for over 90 minutes of participation. Please keep your copy of this consent form
for your records.
PARTICIPANT'S CONSENT. I have had the purposes and procedures of this study
explained to me and have had the opportunity to ask questions. My questions have been
answered to my satisfaction, and I am voluntarily signing this form. My signature shows
my willingness to participate in this study under the conditions stated. If I have questions
about this research study, I can contact Joshua Bullock or Mitchell E. Berman, Ph.D., at
(601) 266-6509 In addition, if I have further questions about my rights as a participant in
this research protocol, I understand that I may contact the Office of Research and
Sponsored Programs at (601) 266-4119.

_______________________ _______
Participant's Signature
Date

_______________________ _______
Witness to Signature
Date

_______________________ _______
Investigator's Signature
Date
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APPENDIX B
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE

Subject Number: __________
Age

Date: ___/___/___

__________

Gender:

Ethnic Group:

_____Male
_____Female

_____Caucasian
_____African-American
_____Hispanic
_____Other (specify ________________________)

Highest academic degree? __________________________________________________
Current occupation? _______________________________________________________

Please circle “Yes” or “No” for the following questions. If you answer yes, please
describe in further detail in the space provided.
Are you currently taking any medication?
Yes No
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________

Have you ever been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder (e.g., Schizophrenia)?
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Yes No
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________

Have you ever been diagnosed with panic disorder or another anxiety disorder?
Yes No
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________
Have you ever been diagnosed with bipolar disorder?
Yes No
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________
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Post Task Questionnaire
Participant #: _______

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. IF YOU DO NOT KNOW AN
ANSWER PLEASE GIVE YOUR BEST GUESS.
1.
Were you following any system with regard to the reaction-time key (e.g., were
you pulling your finger up or to the side, etc.)? Please write a brief sentence.

2.

Was it important for you to win?
Not at All

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Very Much

3.
Compared to most participants, how high were the shocks you set for your
opponent
(circle one statement only).
a. I set much lower shocks than most people in the study
b. I set somewhat lower shocks than most people in the study
c. I set the same shocks as most people in the study
d. I set somewhat higher shocks than most people in the study
e. I set much higher shocks than most people in the study

4.
Compared to most participants, how high were the shocks you set for your
opponent
(circle one statement only).
a. I set much lower shocks than most people in the study
b. I set somewhat lower shocks than most people in the study
c. I set the same shocks as most people in the study
d. I set somewhat higher shocks than most people in the study
e. I set much higher shocks than most people in the study

5.

Why did you choose the shock settings you did? Please explain.

6.

How much did you feel in control of the situation?
Not at All

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Very Much
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7.

How anxious were you during the task?
Not at All

8.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

How concerned were you with what the experimenter thought of you?
Not at All

9.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Very Much

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Very Much

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Very Much

If you did not receive a 20, how painful would you expect a 20 to be?
Not Painful

14.
what

Very Much

How much tissue damage do you think the 20 shock causes?
None

13.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

How painful was the highest shock you took during the threshold procedure?
Not at All

12.

Very Much

How important is it for you to know your opponent?
Not at All

11.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

How concerned were you with what your opponent thought of you?
Not at All

10.

Very Much

12345678

Extremely Painful

Did you know anything about this experiment before you participated (other than
the experimenter told you on the phone)? Please explain:

15.

As best as you can recall, your opponent was:

Male_____

16.

Your best guess about your opponent’s age:

______ years old

17.

How much did you feel your opponent was provoking you?
Not at All

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Very Much

Female_____
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18.

What do you think the purpose of this study is?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX C
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SETTING SHOCK THRESHOLD
“Okay Subjects A and B, I’m going to turn on the microphone so that we can all hear
each other.”
“First, I will give you a series of shocks, increasing the intensity of each one. When the
shock is first presented, it will be below your threshold and you will NOT feel it. As the
intensity increases: first, you will become aware of it; second, it will feel like a tingling
sensation; third, it will feel like a vibration; and finally, the shock will reach an intensity
that is definitely painful. I want you to tell me two things: one, report when you first feel
the shock, and two, report when you don’t want anymore, that is, when it is
DEFINITELY painful.”
“Okay Subject A, let’s begin with you. Tell me when you first feel the shock.”
(pause for Subject A Response)

“Okay, Subject A, now tell me when you don’t want anymore, that is, when the shock
becomes very unpleasant. I will stop the upper threshold procedure when you tell me the
shock is VERY unpleasant—that is, when you can’t take anymore. PLEASE wait to stop
until the shock is painful.”
(Pause for Subject A Response)

“Okay Subject A, we’ll stop there”.
“Okay Subject B, it’s your turn. Tell me when you first feel the shock.”
(Play Subject B Sound File)

“Okay, now tell me when you don’t want anymore, that is, when the shock becomes
VERY unpleasant. I will stop the upper threshold procedure when you tell me the shock
is very unpleasant. PLEASE wait to stop until the shock is painful.”
(Play Subject B Sound File)

“Okay Subject B we’ll stop there”.
Low Effort TAP Instructions
"Okay Subject A and B. We’ll do the task now. The purpose of this task is to determine
the effect of personality matching on the speed with which a finger can be pulled off a
reaction time key—the space bar on the computer. Two of you, situated in separate
rooms, will be competing against each other to see who has the fastest reaction time.
Both of you have the same apparatus in front of you and the same task to perform.
You will see the instructions “Wait, Get Ready, Hold Spacebar, and Release” on the
computer screen. When the computer says to Hold Spacebar, you are to press and hold
down the space bar. When the release signal comes on the screen, you are to remove your
finger from the space bar as fast as you can. Of course, you both will receive the release
signal at the same time. The object of each trial is to get your finger off the space bar as
fast as possible in order to beat your competitor.
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The person who does not get his/her finger off in the shortest time, that is, the person
with the slower reaction time, will receive a shock. There are 12 different intensities of
shock you can receive if you have the slower reaction time: 0 through 10 and a 20. The
degree of shock you actually receive depends upon the degree of shock your opponent
chooses to store in the apparatus before the trial begins.”
“Before each trial, when you see the instructions to choose a shock, you will immediately
set the amount of shock you wish your opponent to receive if you should be faster on the
coming trial. You will do this by briefly pressing, just once, one of the 12 buttons at the
top of the keyboard. The 1-button corresponds to the least intense shock possible. The 10button corresponds to the shock level each of you judged most unpleasant during the
preliminary trials. The 20-button will administer an EXTREMELY PAINFUL shock
twice the intensity of the shock each of you judged most unpleasant in the preliminary
trials. This shock may cause minor tissue damage that will quickly heal, but will have no
permanent effects. If you press the 0-button, NO shock will be delivered.”
“After you have set the amount of shock you wish your opponent to receive on the
coming trial, the actual trial will begin. You will see the signal to press the reaction-time
key. At some time after this, the release signal will flash and you are to remove your
finger as fast as possible. At the end of each trial you will be informed by a message on
the computer screen about the level of shock set by the other person as well as whether
you won or lost the particular trial. The slower person will get a shock of the intensity
that was chosen by the other person. The faster person will not receive the shock that was
set by the other person. If either of you lift your finger off the space bar before the release
signal comes on, a message saying ‘Subject released space bar too soon’ will come on
and the two of you will repeat the trial.
“To summarize: When the signal comes on, you are to briefly set the amount of shock
you wish your competitor to receive if (he/she) should be slower on the coming trial. You
will then press the space bar down and hold it down when signaled, until the 'release'
signal flashes. At this time, you are to remove your finger as fast as possible. The slower
person on that trial will receive the shock set by (his/her) competitor. The faster person
will not receive the shock, but will see the level of shock set for them by their opponent
via a message on the computer screen. It is important that both of you set the shock level
as soon as instructed, and respond to the release signal AS FAST AS YOU CAN.”
Okay, I am going to turn on the computer monitors for both of you, and we’ll start the
task. Give me a ‘thumbs up’ if you can see your monitor.”
High Effort TAP Instructions – Differences are in bold.
"Okay Subject A and B. We’ll do the task now. The purpose of this task is to determine
the effect of personality matching on the speed with which a finger can be pulled off a
reaction time key—the space bar on the computer. Two of you, situated in separate
rooms, will be competing against each other to see who has the fastest reaction time.
Both of you have the same apparatus in front of you and the same task to perform.
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You will see the instructions “Wait, Get Ready, Hold Spacebar, and Release” on the
computer screen. When the computer says to Hold Spacebar, you are to press and hold
down the space bar. When the release signal comes on the screen, you are to remove your
finger from the space bar as fast as you can. Of course, you both will receive the release
signal at the same time. The object of each trial is to get your finger off the space bar as
fast as possible in order to beat your competitor.
The person who does not get his/her finger off in the shortest time, that is, the person
with the slower reaction time, will receive a shock. There are 12 different intensities of
shock you can receive if you have the slower reaction time: 0 through 10 and a 20. The
degree of shock you actually receive depends upon the degree of shock your opponent
chooses to store in the apparatus before the trial begins.”
“Before each trial, when you see the instructions to choose a shock, you will set the level
of shock you wish your opponent to receive if you should be faster on the coming trial.
You will do this by briefly pressing, just once, one of the 12 buttons at the top of the
keyboard. The 1-button corresponds to the least intense shock possible. The 10-button
corresponds to the shock level each of you judged most unpleasant during the preliminary
trials. The 20-button will administer an EXTREMELY PAINFUL shock twice the
intensity of the shock each of you judged most unpleasant in the preliminary trials. This
shock may cause minor tissue damage that will quickly heal, but will have no permanent
effects. If you press the 0-button, NO shock will be delivered. On the computer screen,
you will see a display indicating which shocks are available for you to select. You
will notice that, to begin with, only the 0 button will be available. In order to select
higher shocks you must continue pressing the space bar until the shock you would
like to select becomes available. Once it does, you may press one the corresponding
button on the top of the keyboard to select it.”
“After you have set the amount of shock you wish your opponent to receive on the
coming trial, the actual trial will begin. You will see the signal to press the reaction-time
key. At some time after this, the release signal will flash and you are to remove your
finger as fast as possible. At the end of each trial you will be informed by a message on
the computer screen about the level of shock set by the other person as well as whether
you won or lost the particular trial. The slower person will get a shock of the intensity
that was chosen by the other person. The faster person will not receive the shock that was
set by the other person. If either of you lift your finger off the space bar before the release
signal comes on, a message saying ‘Subject released space bar too soon’ will come on
and the two of you will repeat the trial.
“To summarize: When the signal comes on, you are to briefly set the amount of shock
you wish your competitor to receive if (he/she) should be slower on the coming trial. If
you wish to select a shock higher than 0, you must continue to press the space bar
until your desired shock becomes available on the screen. After you set the shock, you
will then press the space bar down and hold it down when signaled, until the 'release'
signal flashes. At this time, you are to remove your finger as fast as possible. The slower
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person on that trial will receive the shock set by (his/her) competitor. The faster person
will not receive the shock, but will see the level of shock set for them by their opponent
via a message on the computer screen. It is important that both of you set the shock level
as soon as instructed, and respond to the release signal AS FAST AS YOU CAN.”
Okay, I am going to turn on the computer monitors for both of you, and we’ll start the
task. Give me a ‘thumbs up’ if you can see your monitor.
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APPENDIX D
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL FORM
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